On May 28, 2021, members of the Coconet community were among 25 organisations that signed a statement calling on the Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo) to repeal Ministerial Regulation 5 (MR5), which can lead to “prepublication censorship” in its current state.

The law requires private electronic systems operators (ESOs), which include social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok, to monitor and remove “prohibited content”, as flagged by the Indonesian government. ESOs must also be registered in Indonesia. Failure to acquire a license from the ministry by December 2021 will lead to the platform being blocked in the country.

“This requirement for companies to proactively monitor or filter content is both inconsistent with the right to privacy and likely to amount to prepublication censorship”, the statement reads. The law, which came into effect on December 2 last year with little consultation, is also not clear about what constitutes prohibited content.

Read the full statement below:

May 28, 2021

Dear H.E. Johnny G. Plate,
Minister of Communication and Information Technology
Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, Indonesia

We, the undersigned, urge you to repeal Ministerial Regulation 5/2020 (MR5) that is deeply problematic, granting government authorities overly broad powers to regulate online content, access user data, and penalize companies that fail to comply.

MR5 governs all private “electronic systems operators” that are accessible in Indonesia, broadly defined to include social media and other content-sharing platforms, digital marketplaces, search engines, financial services, data processing services, and communications services providing messaging, video calls, or games. This new regulation will affect national and regional digital services and platforms, as well as multinational companies like Google, Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok.

These companies are required to “ensure” that their platform does not contain or facilitate the distribution of “prohibited content”, which implies that they have an obligation to monitor content. Failure to do so can lead to blocking of the entire platform. This requirement for companies to proactively monitor or filter content is both inconsistent with the right to privacy and likely to amount to prepublication censorship.

The regulation’s definition of prohibited content is extremely broad, including not only content in violation of Indonesia’s already overly broad laws restricting speech, but also any material “causing public unrest or public disorder” or information on how to provide access to, or actually providing access to, prohibited material. The latter includes Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), which allow a user to access blocked content and are routinely used by businesses and individuals to ensure privacy for lawful activities.

For “urgent” requests, MR5 requires the company to take down content within four hours. For all other prohibited content, they must do so within 24 hours of being notified by the Ministry. If they fail to do so, regulators can block the service or, in the case of service providers that facilitate user-generated content, impose substantial fines.

MR5 obliges every “Private Electronic System Operator” (Private ESO) to register and obtain an ID certificate issued by the Ministry before people in Indonesia start accessing its services or content.

Previously, registration must take place by May 24th, 2021, but later was postponed, based on a press conference held by Samuel Pangerapan as General Director APTIKA (Directorate of Application and Informatics) of Indonesia MICT, to 6 months until the Single Sign-On (SSO) is ready to be implemented.

Under MR5, Kominfo will sanction non-registrants by blocking their services. Those Private ESOs who decide to register must provide information granting access to their “system” and data to ensure effectiveness in the “monitoring and law enforcement process”. If a registered Private ESO disobeyed the MR5 requirements, for example, by failing to provide “direct access” to their systems (Article 7 (c)), it can be punished in various ways, ranging from a first warning, to temporary blocking, to full blocking and a final revocation of its registration.

Based on our analysis, MR5 does not comply with standards, legal theory or principles, but also does not uphold freedom of expression and other human rights.

The substance of MR5 includes the regulation of digital rights, including restrictions. Considering the right to privacy, it is clear that MR5 exceeds the limits given in Law 12/2011, because it is limited to the framework of “administering certain functions in the government”.  MR5 therefore has the potential to violate freedom of expression and other human rights.

The provisions in MR5 are potentially contrary to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), especially the provisions enabling authorities to obtain personal data from Private ESOs. These concerns are compounded by the absence of independent supervision in obtaining access to personal data, and the fact that in practice, personal data is often misused, especially by law enforcement officials.

The three-part test has not been strictly regulated in the legal mechanism in MR5, so practically, this arrangement opens up space for violations of human rights, particularly the right to privacy.

In MR5, the term “Access Termination”, interpreted as meaning both blocking access to the internet and takedown of an account or a social media post, is used 65 times. This has the potential to limit rights and freedoms, and is very likely to interfere with the interests of Private ESOs. Further, the standard of limitation for the termination of access to the internet is not clearly stipulated within MR5, leaving the powers to terminate access open to abuse and disproportionate application. The failure to include an adequate complaints mechanism further compounds concerns that termination of access will be utilised by authorities arbitrarily and excessively.

The phrase “prohibited” in Article 9 paragraphs (3) and (4) actually has a very wide range and its interpretation opens up space for debate, especially if there is a conflict of interest of State Institutions or law enforcement officials. For example, what is meant by “public disturbance”, what is the standard or measure, who has the authority to determine it, and what if the public feels that it is not part of what is called “disturbing the society”?

With regard to Chapter IV, Article 14, regarding requests for termination of access, it is necessary to consider the restriction standards stipulated in Article 19 paragraph (3) of the ICCPR, including considerations of the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34.

MR5 requires Private ESOs, including social media platforms and other online-based service providers to comply with domestic jurisdiction, both for content and the use of content in daily practice. The legal framework for such obligations weakens the protection of all social media platforms, applications, and other online service providers, especially to accept domestic jurisdiction over user data content and policies and practices. Such a legal framework becomes a repressive instrument that would contradict or even violate human rights.

We call on you to immediately repeal MR5.

Regards,

Access Now (International)

Amnesty International Indonesia (Indonesia)

Alliance of Independent Journalists (Indonesia)

ARTICLE 19

Digital Reach (Thailand)

Electronic Frontier Foundation (International)

EngageMedia (Australia)

ELSAM (Indonesia)

Free Expression Myanmar (Myanmar)

Foundation for Media Alternatives (Philippines)

Greenpeace Indonesia (Indonesia)

Human Rights Watch (International)

Indonesia Corruption Watch (Indonesia)

Indonesia Legal Aid Foundation (Indonesia)

Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (Indonesia)

Komite Perlindungan Jurnalis dan Kebebasan Berekspresi (Indonesia)

LBH Jakarta (Indonesia)

LBH Pers Jakarta (Indonesia)

Manushya Foundation (Thailand)

Open Net Association (South Korea)

Oxen Privacy Tech Foundation (OPTF) (Australia)

Perkumpulan Lintas Feminis Jakarta (Indonesia)

Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) (Indonesia)

TAPOL (United Kingdom)

Unit Kajian Gender dan Seksualitas LPPSP FISIP UI (Indonesia)

The post Statement: Repeal Indonesia law that imposes harsh intermediary liabilities, risks curtailing expression appeared first on Coconet.

Protesters participate in an anti-military rally in downtown Yangon. Image by VOA Burmese via Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.

This statement by civil society organisations in Myanmar was originally published in Free Expression Myanmar, a Coconet community member, on February 11, 2021. It has been republished here with permission.

For more timely updates on #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar, check out and follow the Twitter accounts of Coconet members Free Expression Myanmar and Myanmar ICT for Development Organisation (MIDO).

We, the undersigned civil society organizations, reject the so-called “Cyber Security Bill” drafted by the current military regime, which has not been entrusted by the people with legislative power. 

On 9 February 2021, the Ministry of Transport and Communications issued a directive enclosing the so-called “Cyber Security Bill” – which violates the principles of digital rights, privacy and other human rights – and circulated these documents to mobile operators and telecommunications license holders for comments.

Firstly, as this “bill” is not issued by an institution that has been entrusted with legislative power by the public to act accordingly, we do not accept this as a legitimate bill.

Secondly, the “bill” includes clauses that violate human rights including the rights to freedom of expression, data protection and privacy, and other democratic principles and human rights in the online space. As the “bill” is drafted by the current military regime to oppress those who are against its rule, and to restrict the mobilization and momentum of online resistance, we strongly condemn this action by the current military regime in accordance with our democratic principles.

The issuance of the “bill” is evidence that the military has not only attempted a coup d’état, but is also exercising undue legislative power unlawfully to oppress the public.

If this unlawful action by the current military regime is not denounced strongly in time, military oppression over the country will be long-lived and we, the undersigned civil society organizations, strongly condemn this action by the current military regime and issue the following statements –

1. We do not accept and strongly condemn the military coup d’état and demand the current military regime to return the power to the public immediately without any exceptions.

2. We do not accept, acknowledge or comply with this “bill” and directive as well as any other future “bills” that may be drafted by the current military regime in an attempt to oppress the people.

3. We strongly demand the current military regime to halt any undemocratic practices.

Signed by:

1. Action Committee for Democratic Development (ACDD)
2. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Mandalay)
3. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Ayeyarwady)
4. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Bago)
5. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Magway)
6. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Sagaing)
7. All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress-AASYC
8. Arr Marn Thit Social Development Organization
9. Arakan CSO Network
10. Ananda Data
11. Ahlin Tagar Rural Development Organization
12. Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organisation
13. Ayyar Pyo May Women Development Organization
14. AYY Famar Union
15. Ayeyawady West Development Organization- AWDO (Magway Region)
16. Bandugavlar Civil Call(BCC)
17. Bee House
18. Chin Agency
19. Child Prevention Network
20. Citizen Action for Transparency (ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာလူထုလှုပ်ရှားမှုအဖွဲ့)
21. Civic Engagement Development Network
22. Civic Engagement Network for M2
23. Community Association Development
24. Community Partners Myanmar (Nae Thit Foundation)
25. COMREG Community Response Group
26. Digital Rights Collective
27. Diversity and Public Truth
28. Doe Myae Civil Social Development Organization
29. Doe Myay Community Development Organization (Twantay)
30. Empower Youth Enlightenment (EYE)
31. Empowerment Society
32. Equality Myanmar
33. Famar Agricultural Network
34. Farmers Network (ဝမ်းတွင်း)
35. Farmers and Land Rights Action Group
36. Farmers Development and Environmental Watch Group
37. Free Expression Myanmar (FEM)
38. Free Education Service Organization
39. Freedom and labor Action Group
40. FREELAND Organization Lashio
41. Future Star (မတ္တရာ)
42. Future Star Youth Organization
43. Future Light Social Development Organization
44. Gender Equality Network
45. Genuine People’s Servants – GPS
46. GOAL Organization
47. Golden Future Social Development Organization
48. Golden Heart Organization
49. Green Justice Institute (GJI)
50. Helping Hands (Local Development Organization
51. Hkumzup Development Committee
52. Hope For Children  Development Organization
53. Htum Thit Sa Rural  Development Organization
54. Htoi Gender and Development Foundation
55. Human Rights Defenders & Promoters (HRDP)
56. Human Rights Educators Network
57. Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HRFOM)
58. International Bridges to Justice (Myanmar)
59. Justice For All (လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ခြင်းနှင့် တရားမျှတမှု့ )
60. Justice Movement for Community Inlay
61. Kaung Myat Hnalonethar Health Care Organization
62. Kan Chay Arr Man Fishery Development Organization
63. Kaung Rwai
64. Karenni State Farmer Union
65. Kayah Earthrights Action Network (KEAN)
66. Kachin State Women Network
67. Kachin Women Union
68. Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand (KWAT)
69. Kanaung Institute
70. Kanpetlet Land Development Organization
71. Karen Peace Support Network
72. Keng Tung Youth
73. KESAN Karen Environment and Social Action Network
74. Kings N Queens
75. Kyaukse Youth Network
76. Lamyan Farmers Network
77. LatButta Famar Union
78. Legal Knowledge Sharing Group
79. Let’s Help Each Other
80. LGBT rights Network
81. LAIN Technical Support Group
82. Light Social Development Organization
83. Lin lake Kyal Social Development Organization
84. Mandalay Affairs Team
85. Mandalay Community Center
86. Mandalay Regional Youth Association (MRYA)
87. Mandalay Regional Youth Network
88.  Mandalay Women Political Federation (MWPF – မန္တလေး)
89. Mann Thingaha (Gender GBV Team)
90. Maramagri Youth Network
91. MATA(Sagaing)
92. Matupi Women Association
93. Meiktila Youth Network
94. Minhla Youth Center
95. Muditar Organization
96. Myanmar Media Lawyers’ Network
97. Myan ICT for Development Organisation (MIDO)
98. Myanmar Cultural Research Society (MCRS)
99. Myanmar Deaf Society
100. Myanmar Fifth Estate
101. Myanmar Independent Living Initiative
102. Myanmar Muslim Youth Association (Kachin State)
103. Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State)
104. National Network for Education Reform
105. Natural Green Alliance (သဘာဝစိမ်း သဘာဝပါတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေး မိတ်ဖက် အင်အားစု)
106. Never End Tomorrow(NeT)
107. Network for Human Rights Documentation Burma (ND-Burma)
108. Ninggawn Institute (NI)
109. Northern Spectrum Youth Association
110. Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica
111. Open Development Foundation
112. Our Home
113. Our Lovely World
114. Olive Organization
115. P.D.C.E (Peace, Development & Civic Engagement)
116. Paung Ku
117. Pa-O Women’s Union
118. Pan Thi Kyo LGBT Organization
119. Paungsee Myittar Organization
120. Peace & Development Center (Meikhtila)
121. Peace Development Committee (မိတ္ထီလာ)
122. PEN Myanmar (ပဲန်မြန်မာ)
123. Phyu Sin Myittar Social Development Organization
124. Pluralistic Society
125. Pone Yate Sit Regional Development Organization
126. Progressive Voice
127. Pwint Phyu Development Organisation
128. Pyi Gyi Khin
129. Rule of law watch group
130. Rural Social Development Organization
131. SarPhyu Famar Network
132. Sarnar Kyi Phyu Social Development Organization
133. Sandhi Governance Institute
134. Saytana Shaesaung Youth Organization
135. Second Tap Root (ဒုတိယရေသောက်မြစ်)
136. Shan MATA
137. Shan State Ethnic Youth Federation
138. Shan State Peace Task Force (သျှမ်းပြည်နယ်ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးအလုပ်အဖွဲ့)
139. Shan Women Development Network
140. Shan Youth Yangon
141. Shwechinthae Social Service Group (Shwebo)
142. Shwe Nathar Famar Development Organization
143. Smile Myanmar
144. Socio- Economic & Gender Resource Institute
145. Social Care Volunteer Group (SCVG)
146. Southern Youth Development Organisation
147. SPACE
148. Spectrum Organization
149. Student Voice
150. Summer Shelter Library
151. Swam Su Ti Rural Development Organization
152. Ta’ang Women’s Organisation
153. Tai Youth Organization – TYO
154. TEN, Taunggyi Education Network
155. Thazi Youth Network
156. The Seagull: Human Rights, Peace & Development Pluralistic Society
157. The Khumi Institute (TKI)
158. TRI STAR
159. Triangle Women Support Group
160. TRY Organization
161. Uakthon Local Social Development Organization
162. Unity Arch Bridge Organization
163. Waingmaw CSO Network
164. White Marker Group
165. Win Peace
166. Women & Youth’s Development Organization (WYDO)
167. Worker Development Organization
168. Women Development Organization
169. Women organization Network ( WON )
170. Yatanar Youngyi Social Development Organization
171. Yai Ywal Yar Youth Development Organization
172. Yi Ywal Yar Community Development
173. Youth Champion Network
174. Youth/29 Creative Society
175. Young Ni Oo Women Social Development Organization
176. Young Ni Oo Social Development Organization
177. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် စဉ့်ကူး
178. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် မြစ်သား
179. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် မိထ္တီလာ
180. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် သပိတ်ကျင်း
181. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် သာစည်
182. ကျောက်ပန်းတောင်း လူငယ်ကွန်ယက်
183. ခြေလှမ်းသစ်လူမှုဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးအဖွဲ့
184. စိမ်းရောင်စို (တံတားဦး)
185. စိမ်းရောင်စို Activities
186. တမာရိပ်
187. တောင်သမန်ကွန်ယက်
188. ဒို့တိုးတက်ရာ အစည်းအရုံး
189. ဒို့တောင်သူလယ်သမားအဖွဲ့
190. ဒို့မြေကွန်ရက်
191. “ဒို့”တောင်သူလယ်သမားအဖွဲ့အစည်း(ဝမ်းတွင်း)
192. ပျော်ဘွယ် လူငယ်ကွန်ယက်
193. ပွင့်ဖြူလယ်ယာမြေကွန်ရက် (မကွေးတိုင်း)
194. မဇ္စျိမမေတ္တာ ရေလှူအသင်း (မိတ္ထီလာ)
195. မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီးအရပ်ဘက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ မဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့
196. မင်းလတောင်သူအစုအဖွဲ့။
197. မတ္တရာ လူငယ်ကွန်ယက်
198. မန္တလေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီး လူငယ်ရေးရာကော်မတီ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ
199. မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီးလူငယ်ကွန်ယက်
200. မြစ်ကွေ့ဧရာလူမှုကွန်ရက်(မကွေးမြို့)
201. မြေလတ်မျိုးဆက်အင်စတီကျု
202. မြင်းခြံ နိုင်ကျဉ်းအဖွဲ့
203. မြင့်မြတ်ဧရာဝတီ လူငယ်လူမှု့ကွန်ယက်
204. မြေလတ်မျိုးဆက်အင်စတီကျု
205. မေမြို့ တောင်သူကွန်ယက်
206. ယုံကြည်ရာ အသိပညာပြန့်ပွားရေးအသင့်
207. ရွှေခြင်္သေ့တောင်သူကွန်ရက်(ရွှေဘိုခရိုင်)
208. ရွှေခြံအားမာန်အဖွဲ့ မြင်းခြံ
209. ရွှေမင်းသားဖောင်ဒေးရှင်း
210. ရွှေမင်းသား မသန်စွမ်း ဖောင်ဒေးရှင်း ( မြန်မာ )
211. ရှစ်လေးလုံးသွေးသစ် (မိုးညှင်း)
212. လက်လှမ်းမှီရေးအဖွဲ့
213. လွတ်လပ်သောအရှိုချင်အမျိုးသားများအင်အားစု
214. ဝိုင်းမော်မြို့နယ်လုံးဆိုင်ရာ သျှမ်းလူငယ်များစည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့
215. ဝါးစိမ်းတောင်ကာကွယ်စောင့်ကြည့်ရေးကော်မတီ (WPWC)
216. သင့်မြတ်လိုသူများ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးပရဟိတအဖွဲ့
217. သုခမိန်အင်စတီကျု
218. သုခုမခရီးသည်အဖွဲ့
219. အမျိုးသမီးနိုင်ငံရေး အင်အားစု
220. အိမ်ယာမဲ့ပြည်သူများ အစည်းအရုံး
221. အောင်သာစည်အဖွဲ့
222. Gender and Development Institute
223. Good Shepherd Myanmar Foundation (GSMF)
224. Kachin Women Peace Network
225. Muditar Foundation
226. Myanmar Positive Women Network
227. Mandalar Yaung Sin
228. Myanmar Independent Living Initiative- MILI
229. National Network of Rural Women- May Doe Kabar
230. Phan Tee Eain (Creative Home)
231. POINT
232. Progetto Continenti
233. Ratana Metta Organization
234. Sex Worker in Myanmar Network
235. Spectrum (SDKN)
236. Socio-Economic & Gender Resource Institute Myanmar
237. Student Christian Movement Myanmar
238. Women’s Federation for Peace
239. Generation Wave

The post Myanmar Civil Society Statement on the draft Cyber Security Law appeared first on Coconet.

Photo from OCF, credited to 內政部釋出圖片

 

Digital identification, or digital IDs, have become more common in Asia, with some countries even mandating its use for their citizens. Coconet community member Open Culture Foundation (OCF) has published a series of articles on the digital ID experiences of five countries in Asia – Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea – and listed various issues that need to be tackled before digital IDs can be adopted more thoroughly in the region.

The three-part series is available in English and Chinese. Below are excerpts from each of the three articles.

Part 1: Digital ID in Taiwan

“Taiwan once again launched its comprehensive digital ID project in 2015, which made the third attempt to officially launch a project related to digital ID by the government, preceded by its previous efforts in 1998 and 2005 respectively.

This policy of producing digital ID has undergone numerous revisions since its launch in 2015. The latest version is the government to combine the existing National ID Card and the Citizen Digital Certificate into a new digital ID card with a chip (i.e. New eID), which is expected to go for a trial run in certain municipalities in January 2021 before a total rollout in July 2021.

In Taiwan, all citizens are required to have an ID card. The cards at present are paper-based in hardcopy. Yet, should citizens want to be digitally authenticated with their IDs, they can ‘voluntarily’ apply for a ‘Citizen Digital Certificate’ from the Ministry of the Interior. It is a system that has been operated for years prior to this rollout of New eID.”

Read Part 1 in English and Chinese.

Part 2: Digital ID in Taiwan

“Malaysia’s National Digital ID Study Task Force organised a study from November 2019 to July 2020, to gauge public opinion through a survey posted on the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission’s website.

Data security remains a real concern for some Malaysians, however, as the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (PDPA) is seemingly inadequate in providing well-rounded data security. While the PDPA is able to regulate the use of personal data in the private sector, it cannot be enforced in the public sector. In other words, the use of personal data by the Malaysian government or by government organizations is not regulated by the PDPA, which might pose a data security risk.

Lawyer Louis Liaw from the Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership agrees that the National Digital Identity Initiative will bring more convenience to the lives of Malaysians, especially since internet and smartphone penetration rates in Malaysia are already rather high. However, he also believes that there should be legislation in place to regulate and legalise the National Digital Identity framework, so as to strengthen the people’s confidence in the government’s ability to protect their personal data. ‘Something is needed to regulate the government,’ the lawyer quipped while maintaining a positive outlook on the benefits the National Digital Identity Initiative would bring to Malaysia.”

Read Part 2 in English and Chinese. 

Part 3: Digital Identity in Singapore & South Korea

“The digital ID experiences of these five countries reveal that many people still have reservations regarding the use of digital ID as they lack confidence in the law and the government’s ability to protect their personal data. Data breach still poses a very real threat despite the severe punishment meted out in Singapore, the existence of a law protecting personal data in Malaysia and the change in legislation in South Korea.”

Read Part 3 in English and Chinese.

 

About the Author

The Open Culture Foundation is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization, founded in 2014 by several members of Taiwan’s open source community.

The post Excerpt: “On the Use of Digital Identity in Asia”, a three-part series on digital IDs appeared first on Coconet.

EngageMedia invites filmmakers, video journalists, and animators across the Asia-Pacific to produce short films on important digital rights issues happening in our region, as told with our voices and from our perspectives. The produced works will be included in Tech Tales, a film collection that will be used to further digital rights advocacy and campaigns.

Up to eight filmmakers will each be awarded between USD 3,000 and 5,000 to produce their respective films. Tech Tales accepts documentaries, fiction, animation, and other short narrative video productions.

Apply to Tech Tales by filling out the form at EngageMedia.org. The deadline for applications has been extended to 20 January 2021, 23:59 Bangkok time (UTC+7).

If you encounter any errors in the application form, or have any questions about the Tech Tales project, please feel free to reach out via the EngageMedia contact page.

The post Funding Opportunity: Applications now open to produce ‘Tech Tales’ digital rights films appeared first on Coconet.

The post Human Rights Day 2020: ‘Recover Better’ in Physical and Digital Spaces appeared first on Coconet.

Seringkali, pertanyaan, “Apa itu hak digital” dijawab dengan “HAM di ruang digital”, atau “HAM yang tercipta melalui penggunaan teknologi dan internet”.

HAM secara jelas didefinisikan oleh PBB melalui Deklarasi Universal Hak Asasi Manusia atau Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), dan telah diturunkan ke dalam berbagai peraturan hukum yang mengikat. Namun ikatan-ikatan hukum serupa tidak — atau belum — diterapkan untuk istilah apalagi hak “digital”, “teknologi”, atau “internet”. Karena itu, saat membongkar istilah-istilah ini, kita akan menemukan serangkaian tafsiran yang lebih luas.

Sebagai contoh, istilah digital seringkali digabungkan dengan online atau internet. Padahal ada banyak objek dan sistem digital yang tidak terhubung internet. Misalnya, data biometrik seperti pengenal wajah (facial recognition) dan pemeriksaan sidik jari (fingerprinting) di pos-pos perbatasan adalah salah satu contoh sistem digital yang tidak mutlak membutuhkan internet (meski mungkin terhubung ke intranet).

Begitu pula, istilah teknologi atau tech, sepanjang dekade terakhir seringkali disamakan dengan teknologi digital, sementara teknologi analog tidak lagi diperhitungkan sebagai tech karena dianggap tidak mutakhir. (Coba ketik “tech” pada mesin pencari dan lihat betapa mayoritas hasilnya akan merujuk pada “digital tech”.)  Di Indonesia bahkan muncul istilah “gaptek” atau “gagap teknologi” bagi yang dianggap kurang melek literasi digital. Di tengah saturasi digital tech ini, tak ayal muncul pula kejenuhan terhadap “digital tech”, yang berdampak pada semacam romantisasi teknologi analog. Sebagai contoh, lempengan rekaman vinyl dan buku cetak sebagai teknologi analog kerap dianggap sebagai lebih “asli”, “otentik” ketimbang produk digital seperti file mp3 atau buku elektronik.

Menjelajahi definisi, menantang asumsi

Selama Kamp Coconet II hak-hak digital bulan Oktober tahun 2019 lalu, kami mengajak 120 changemakers untuk mendefinisikan hak-hak digital dalam konteks Asia-Pasifik. Tak mengejutkan, berbagai definisi bermunculan:

• Hak digital adalah pelaksanaan hak asasi manusia di dalam dunia digital.
• Hak digital adalah hak mengekspresikan diri secara aman, privat, terjamin dan berkelanjutan di dunia digital.
• Hak digital adalah hal yang mendasar dan Hak Asasi Manusia yang diwarisi untuk mempromosikan inklusi, kesetaraan, akses ke infrastruktur, dan informasi. Hak digital memastikan kontrol, otonomi, dan agensi manusia sekaligus perlindungan terhadap privatisasi, monopolisasi dan monetisasi kemanusiaan.
• Hak digital adalah Hak Asasi Manusia yang mendasar di dalam lingkup digital. Ia berupa kebebasan berekspresi, berasosiasi dan berkumpul, akses kepada peralatan internet, hak atas informasi, hak mengakses layanan (mulai dari media sosial hingga sistem kependudukan, perbankan, dan lain-lain), hak hidup dalam ruang daring aman (online safe-space) dengan aspek perlindungan keamanan (security) dan kepastian, privasi dan perlindungan data, peka-gender, anti diskriminasi, dan setara.
• Hak digital adalah seperangkat Hak Asasi Manusia universal yang memastikan setiap orang – terlepas dari jenis kelamin, usia, ras, gender, dan lainnya – memiliki akses yang sama terhadap internet terbuka yang dikelola secara inklusif, akuntabel, dan transparan, untuk memastikan terjaminnya kebebasan dan hak-hak mendasar milik rakyat.
• Hak digital adalah Hak Asasi Manusia daring yang memungkinkan akses terhadap informasi dan kebebasan berekspresi di tempat yang aman, yang menghormati privasi dan keamanan.
• Hak digital adalah Hak Asasi Manusia yang melekat pada pengguna maupun bukan pengguna TIK (teknologi informasi dan komunikasi). Ia akan memastikan akses ke hak yang sama terhadap informasi, teknologi, dan pengetahuan; bebas dari kekerasan, pengawasan (surveillance), dan diskriminasi; dan menghormati privasi, otonomi dan penentuan nasib sendiri.
• Hak digital adalah HAM daring yang peduli soal akses, partisipasi, keamanan data dan privasi, dengan merengkuh nilai kemanusiaan atas kehormatan, penghargaan, kesetaraan, keadilan, tanggung jawab, kesepakatan (consent) dan keberlangsungan lingkungan hidup.
• Hak digital memberdayakan manusia melawan perusahaan-perusahaan dan mendorong partisipasi yang setara dan adil.

Jawaban dari Coconet II ini menggemakan jawaban kalimat pendek yang sering kita dengar tentang hak asasi manusia di lingkungan digital di awal artikel ini. Namun jawaban-jawaban ini juga menunjukkan bahwa tidak seperti hak asasi manusia (HAM) yang didefinisikan dengan jelas dan mengikat secara hukum, penafsiran istilah digital, internet, dan teknologi sangatlah beragam, dengan istilah digital terkadang disamakan dengan daring atau terhubung ke internet.

Istilah lain yang kerap muncul dalam pola dikotomi adalah “nyata (real)” dan “virtual”, yang seolah mengatakan interaksi fisik sebagai lebih “nyata” ketimbang interaksi digital atau “virtual”. Tetapi jika kita membuat asumsi itu, apakah kita mengatakan bahwa semua interaksi digital tidak nyata? Dan apa implikasi dari asumsi ini? Apakah ini menyiratkan bahwa ruang “virtual” dan pelecehan daring tidak “nyata”? Dan, akibatnya, apakah semua interaksi fisik selalu nyata? Apakah kita bisa menentukan batasan antara daring dan luring dengan tegas, atau apakah keduanya saling memengaruhi, sehingga melibatkan satu sama lain?

Dari pembahasan singkat di atas, kita dapati muncul berapa istilah terkait yang seringkali dipasangkan sebagai lawan biner. Misalnya: daring – luring; digital – analog atau fisik; nyata – virtual.

Tentu saja, semua definisi dan asumsi ini terbuka untuk dibahas. Artikel ini tidak bertujuan untuk memberikan jawaban yang definitif atau  komprehensif. Sebaliknya, kita perlu menantang asumsi dan ingin mengajak Anda menjelajahi kompleksitas mendefinisikan hak digital.

Mengenali dan mengonsep kerangka kerja hak digital hak digital

Deklarasi Afrika soal Hak dan Kebebasan Internet merupakan deklarasi berskala luas yang mendalami prinsip-prinsip untuk menegakkan hak-hak rakyat dalam ruang daring, sehingga dapat mempertemukan perkembangan kebutuhan dan tujuan sosial-ekonomi Afrika. Pada 2015, masyarakat sipil Filipina memaklumkan Deklarasi Prinsip dan Kebebasan Internet Filipina, sebuah deklarasi berkode terbuka yang mencerminkan impian, harapan, dan aspirasi masyarakat Filipina mengenai internet.

Sementara itu, Organisasi Pendidikan, Ilmu Pengetahuan, dan Kebudayaan PBB (UNESCO) pada 2015 mengidentifikasi lebih dari 50 kerangka kerja dan deklarasi khusus Internet. Di tahun yang sama, Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society Research, mendapati 30 konstitusi semacam itu beserta 42 daftar hak-hak, yang dikategorisasikan ke dalam tujuh tema. Tiga tema utama yang disoroti karena keluasan cakupannya dalam kerangka kerja tersebut antara lain adalah: kebebasan berekspresi, hak privasi, dan hak untuk mengakses internet. Tema penting lainnya adalah kebebasan informasi, transparansi, dan keterbukaan proses dan jaringan tata kelola internet.

Menawarkan empat ruang hak digital

Jun-E Tan, seorang peneliti independen dan peserta Coconet II dari Malaysia yang telah melakukan penelitian tentang hak digital di sejumlah negara di Asia Tenggara, menunjukkan bagaimana beberapa studi atau dokumen tentang hak digital sebetulnya malah mempersempit ruang lingkup pembahasan menjadi “dua hingga tiga hak teratas untuk melanjutkan kerja analitis atau advokasi praktis mereka”. Namun tanpa melakukan kerangka konseptualisasi, ujarnya, kita berisiko mengabaikan atau mengorbankan hak-hak asasi yang penting dengan mempedulikan hanya hak-hak yang telah lebih umum dikenal .

Dalam kertas kerja risetnya tahun 2019 mengenai hak-hak digital di Asia Tenggara, Jun-E menawarkan untuk memperluas konsep hak digital dengan mempertimbangkan empat ruang cakupan, yakni:

1. dengan melihat digital sebagai HAM konvensional di ruang digital;
2. dengan melihat digital sebagai representasi data dari entitas fisik, sehingga perlu memfokuskan hak digital pada keamanan dan privasi data;
3. akses ke ruang digital dan partisipasi yang bermakna; dan
4. partisipasi dalam tata kelola digital atau Internet.

Tentu saja, kerangka kerja Jun-E bukanlah satu-satunya yang benar, sah, atau valid, namun tawaran kerangka kerjanya baru dibangun dari riset di beberapa negeri Asia Tenggara, khususnya Malaysia, Thailand, dan Filipina. (Untuk mengetahui lebih lanjut tentang seluk-beluk dan tantangan soal konsep hak digital dalam konteks Asia Tenggara, Anda bisa mengakses penelitiannya.)

Seperti yang telah ditekankan di seluruh artikel ini, ada banyak cara yang bisa digunakan untuk membingkai hak digital, terutama yang berkaitan dengan konteks dan pengalaman yang berbeda di kawasan Asia-Pasifik. Semoga dengan membagikan definisi-definisi di atas dari anggota komunitas Coconet, kami dapat berkontribusi dalam membangun strategi dan gerakan penegakan hak-hak digital — dan memikirkan ulang apa yang mendapat perhatian dan apa yang diabaikan dalam pendefinisian batas-batas hak digital. Jika Anda memiliki ide atau saran, sudi kiranya mengontak kami.

 

Mengenai penulis

Kathleen Azali adalah Manager Program Hak Digital – Digital Rights Program Manager of EngageMedia. Dia merupakan periset & aktivis yang melakukan kerja di antara sejumlah bidang informasi, teknologi, desain dan ekonomi politik.

The post Apa itu Hak Digital? appeared first on Coconet.

Screenshot shared with permission from reunion attendees

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was never a surprise to see a fellow member of the Coconet community in a conference or project meeting anywhere around the globe. Community members, all former attendees of either the first or second Coconet digital rights camps, often had to travel, as networking is an integral part of mainstreaming digital rights and strengthening solidarity among civil society actors in the region.

The pandemic, however, has put a halt to that. And not only that — soliciting and showing solidarity has been challenging in light of webinar and virtual meeting fatigue, the abrupt migration to virtual systems, and prolonged confinement in our respective homes, among other reasons.

In spite of all this, Coconet members reunited online on November 5, 2020, to collectively reflect on the pandemic’s challenges to the community. The online reunion was an anniversary celebration for participants from both camps, as these were held in the last week of October in 2017 and 2019, respectively. It was also a chance for members to share updates on our countries and local movements.

Looking forward to the future

The two-hour virtual gathering was attended by members from Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

We jump-started the reunion by asking everyone to give one thing they were looking forward to in the future. Members’ responses were varied, from wishing for less cold winters to continuing to fight against companies with surveillance-based business models.

Still, the strongest hope for all was to see and bond with each other again in person. As activists, this hope is with the recognition that while we wait for physical interactions to happen again, we need to adapt and respond to the whole new set of challenges emphasised and unearthed by the pandemic. We also need to be ready to respond to how governments are taking advantage of the pandemic to increase state surveillance and stifle freedom of expression.

Members’ concerns amid the pandemic

Below are specific themes that were apparent over the course of the gathering:

Difficulty in migrating to virtual systems

While the members primarily belong to organisations working on digital rights, digital security, and internet freedom, some members still faced difficulties migrating to fully virtual systems due to the costs and inadequate time for orientation. Others also expressed concern about organisations opting for corporate tech products due to convenience, forgoing privacy concerns.

Privacy and security concerns over digital ID systems

In Taiwan, Nepal, and Indonesia, there is a stronger call for digitising national ID systems, but drafted implementing rules and regulations have had little to no provisions on data protection, privacy, and storage.

Elections and digital rights

In Myanmar, voting during the November 8 elections was cancelled in ethnic minority areas due to the pandemic. Polls were also closed in Rakhine and Chin states, where the longest internet shutdown in the world is ongoing and where the highest number of COVID-19 cases in the country have been recorded. These states are also in the middle of a civil war that has killed hundreds of civilians over the past two years. Protests against the shutdown and the civil war have led to activists being arrested and sentenced to jail. (Sign a joint statement here against the arrests.)

Vietnam and Malaysia will also be having their elections soon. Members said they will be sure to be on the lookout for digital rights violations, especially with the increase of hate speech and disinformation online during this time.

State attacks on media freedom and freedom of speech

In Cambodia, there is a crackdown of dissenters criticising the government’s relationship with China. There were reports of officials personally approaching journalists to take down articles that tackle China’s increasing role in Cambodia’s economy.

In the Philippines, the controversial Anti-Terrorism Law was passed in July 2020. The new law allows the state to tag any individual and group as alleged terrorists, and detain suspects for a maximum of 24 days,

In Thailand, the government had also attempted to ban four independent media outlets and a Facebook page from broadcasting, claiming that they “threaten national security”. The ban has since been lifted, but protests continue.

In Vietnam, Facebook is aiding the government to censor dissent. Users who post any sentiment against the state can also be jailed for a minimum of six years.

Attacks and surveillance during protests

In Indonesia, protests against the Omnibus Law, which weakens labour rights and environmental protection laws, erupted last month. Police were reported to have confiscated the phones and laptops of protesters, and have deployed upgraded surveillance planes in demonstration areas. Digital attacks, such as doxxing and an increase in anti-protest narratives, have also been on the rise.

In Thailand, activists and protesters are subjected to sexual harassment and hate speech online to invalidate their campaigns.

Together, we are never alone

At the end of the reunion, members left with a keen sense of commitment to continue working together despite the challenges in organising movements in the time of the pandemic. Threats to digital rights may have increased, but that only makes the need to strengthen the movement in the region all the more urgent and necessary.

Most importantly, we left the call with a renewed belief that we are never alone in this fight for digital rights because we are all part of this movement together.

The post Coconet Virtual Reunion: Reaffirming solidarity amid COVID-19 appeared first on Coconet.

Disputes during the 2019 presidential elections have become one of the important records of the digital rights situation in Indonesia over the past year. Nevertheless, violation of digital rights in Indonesia also happened because of other reasons, like social environment conflict, especially in the regional area. Citizens are either criminalised or their right to security is violated because of their vigilance over public services.

The increasing of criminalisation of citizens due to their activities on the Internet in 2019 has become one of the situations that continue to repeat every year. It is the same with the silencing of critical voices of citizens who express their thoughts and argue over the Internet, especially on social media. Most of the victims are activists and journalists, but new victims have emerged, particularly academics.

The Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) has been paying attention to the issue of digital rights since 2018, five years after the network was founded, which initially only advocated for freedom of expression online. In general, these digital rights include the right to access the Internet, the right to express using digital media, and the right to feel secure in digital media.

This report is an attempt to not only record the various violations of digital rights that happened during 2019, but also place them in a bigger context as to how they impact democracy. As new terminology, digital rights have not received serious attention, including how these rights are closely related to more fundamental rights, human rights.

Aside from being a tool to introduce digital rights issues, we hope this digital rights situation report can be our advocacy in pushing the country to create fulfilment and protection of digital rights. Happy reading.

The 2019 Indonesian Digital Rights Situation Report can be downloaded here or by clicking the image below.

The report by SAFEnet will be formally launched during a webinar on November 13, 2020, 14:00 Jakarta time (UTC+7). Click here to register to the webinar, and follow SAFEnet on Twitter for more details on the event.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ellen Kusuma is a member of SAFEnet’s Security and Safety Division. 

The post Indonesia Digital Rights Situation Report 2019: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism appeared first on Coconet.

In January 2020, WITNESS published on its blog an English guide to documenting during internet shutdowns. Almost a year later, all five parts of the guide was made available in Bahasa Indonesia.

Coconet.social is republishing in both English and Bahasa Indonesian the first article of the series. WITNESS Senior Manager of Programs for Asia and Pacific Arul Prakkash, who is also a member of the Coconet community, contributed to the original guide and translation to Bahasa Indonesian. 

Click here to read the article in Indonesian.

Documenting During Internet Shutdowns

In June 2019, as human rights abuses and a humanitarian crisis were continuing in Myanmar, the country’s Ministry of Transport and Communication directed telecom companies to shut down their mobile internet service in parts of Rakhine State and neighbouring Chin State. Citing “disturbances of the peace” and “illegal activities,” the Myanmar government claims to have enacted the shutdown “for the benefit of the people.” In reality, the blackout cut over a million people off from access to essential information and communication and disrupted humanitarian efforts. As Matthew Smith from Fortify Rights has stated, “This shutdown is happening in a context of ongoing genocide against Rohingya and war crimes against Rakhine, and even if it were intended to target militants, it’s egregiously disproportionate.”

The shutdown was partially lifted on five of the townships in September 2019, but is ongoing. During the same month, in neighbouring Bangladesh where many Rohingya have fled, authorities ordered mobile phone operators to block 3G and 4G services in Rohingya refugee camps and to stop selling SIM cards to Rohingya. As we enter 2020, four townships in Rakhine continue to be cut off from the world, and Bangladesh continues to limit service in the refugee camps.

Documenting During Internet Shutdowns

“Internet shutdowns and human rights violations go hand in hand."

Globally, internet shutdowns are on the rise. According to AccessNow’s #KeepItOn campaign, there were 128 intentional shutdowns between January – July 2019, compared to 196 in all of 2018, and up sharply from 106 in 2017, and 75 in 2016. Around the world, governments, with the cooperation of telecom companies, are increasingly turning to internet shutdowns as a strategy to repress communities, prevent mobilization, and stop information about human rights violations from being documented and shared. Shutdowns can take various forms, including platform-specific blockages that target popular apps and sites, mobile data shutdowns, bandwidth throttling, or total internet blackouts. All of these types of shutdowns are intended to disrupt the ability to communicate information and expose violations in real-time. They often occur during protests, elections, and periods of political instability, and are often accompanied by heightened state repression, military offensives, and violence. While governments may try to justify shutdowns in the name of “public safety” or other reasons, shutdowns clearly take place at moments when repressive states fear losing tenuous control over their people, information, or political narrative. Shutdowns violate human rights, severely disrupt people’s lives and livelihoods, and also have a global economic impact.

Documenting human rights violations is as important as ever during an internet shutdown. Even if information cannot be shared in the moment, documentation can be a way to preserve voices that authorities are trying to silence and to secure evidence of abuses that can be used to demand accountability later on. Of course, the repressive context and the technological impediments of an internet shutdown make documenting violations—and maintaining that documentation securely—much more challenging and risky. How can activists capture and preserve their videos during a shutdown, and even share them offline, and do so in safer ways? 

This series

Through our work with activists who have experienced internet shutdowns, we have learned some useful tips and approaches to capturing and preserving video documentation during internet shutdowns that we are sharing in this series. We wrote them with Android devices in mind, but the tips can be applied to iPhones as well. Some of the strategies require planning (and often, internet access), so it’s a good idea to review them and implement any steps before you are in a situation where you do not have internet and you need to document. Save a copy of any of the tutorials so you can refer to them or share them during a shutdown. And finally, start practising the techniques and methods in your everyday work so that they become second-nature before you’re in a crisis.

• Prepare
  • Setting up a phone for offline documentation
• Capture
  • Should I use this documentation app?
• Maintain
  • Maintaining verifiable media during an internet shutdown 
  • Backing up phone media without the internet or a computer 
• Share and Communicate
  • File sharing and communication during an internet shutdown

One final note: While these tips can help you continue documenting in the face of a shutdown, we want to emphasize that the ultimate solution must be to restore internet access and successfully defend people’s right to record, and freedom of expression, information, and assembly. Fortunately, there is a global movement led by organizations like NetBlocks, AccessNow, and many others who are actively monitoring and sharing information about shutdowns. Advocates globally are engaging in strategic litigation against shutdowns. We stand in solidarity with their work to uphold human rights.

Cara Pendokumentasian Selama Pemadaman Internet

Pada bulan Juni 2019, saat pelanggaran HAM dan krisis kemanusiaan terus berlangsung di Myanmar, Menteri Perhubungan dan Komunikasi negara tersebut memerintahkan perusahaan telekomunikasi untuk memadamkan layanan internet seluler di wilayah Rakhine dan tetangganya Chin. Pemerintah Myanmar mengklaim melakukan pemadaman (shutdown) “untuk kepentingan umum”, menyebutnya sebagai “gangguan pada perdamaian” dan “aktivitas ilegal”. Pada kenyataannya, pemadaman internet terhadap sejuta orang itu memotong akses ke informasi dan komunikasi mendasar  serta mengganggu upaya kemanusiaan. Seperti pernyataan yang disampaikan Matthew Smith dari Fortify Rights, “Shutdown ini terjadi dalam konteks berlangsungnya genosida atas etnis Rohingya dan kejahatan perang terhadap Rakhine, dan bahkan jika ini ditujukan untuk menarget militan, tindakan ini jelas-jelas tidak sesuai proporsi.”

Pemadaman ini dipulihkan sebagian di 5 kota kecil pada September 2019, tapi masih terus berlangsung. Di bulan yang sama, di negeri tetangga Bangladesh di mana banyak suku Rohingya mengungsi, pemangku kekuasaan memerintahkan operator ponsel untuk memblokir layanan 3G dan 4G di kamp pengungsian Rohingya dan berhenti menjual kartu SIM kepada suku Rohingya. Memasuki tahun 2020, 4 kota kecil di Rakhine terus mengalami pemotongan akses dari dunia, dan Bangladesh terus membatasi layanan servis di kamp-kamp pengungsian.

Pendokumentasian Selama Pemadaman Internet

“Pemadaman internet dan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia berjalan beriringan.”

Secara global, pemadaman internet terus meningkat. Berdasarkan kampanye #KeepItOn AccessNow, ada 128 pemadaman yang disengaja selama bulan Januari-Juli 2019, dibandingkan dengan total 196 pada 2018, dan meningkat tajam dari tahun 2017 sebanyak 106 pemadaman, dan 75 pada tahun 2016. Di seluruh dunia, pemerintah bersama perusahaan telekomunikasi, melakukan pemadaman internet sebagai strategi untuk menekan masyarakat, mencegah mobilisasi, serta menghentikan penyebaran dan pendokumentasian informasi terkait pelanggaran hak asasi manusia.

Pemadaman internet bisa dilakukan dalam berbagai bentuk, termasuk pemblokiran terhadap platform spesifik yang menargetkan aplikasi dan situs populer, pemadaman data seluler, pembatasan bandwidth, atau pemadaman total internet. Semua jenis shutdown ini bertujuan untuk mengganggu  penyampaian informasi dan pengungkapan berbagai pelanggaran secara real-time. Hal ini sering terjadi selama unjuk rasa, pemilihan umum, dan periode ketidakstabilan politik, serta seringkali disertai dengan meningkatnya penindasan oleh negara, serangan militer dan kekerasan. Walaupun pemerintah mencoba untuk membenarkan shutdown atas nama keamanan publik atau alasan lainnya, shutdown jelas dilakukan pada saat negara takut kehilangan kendali atas masyarakat, informasi, atau narasi politik. Shutdowns melanggar hak asasi manusia, sangat mengganggu kehidupan dan mata pencaharian, serta berdampak pada ekonomi global.

Mendokumentasikan pelanggaran HAM sama pentingnya selama pemadaman internet. Bahkan jika informasi tidak dapat disebarkan pada saat itu, dokumentasi dapat menjadi cara untuk menjaga suara-suara yang berusaha dibungkam pihak berwenang, serta untuk mengamankan bukti pelanggaran yang dapat digunakan untuk menuntut pertanggungjawaban di kemudian hari. Proses pendokumentasian pelanggaran dan upaya menjaga dokumentasi ini tentu saja menjadi lebih menantang dan berisiko karena represi dan hambatan teknologi selama internet shutdown. Bagaimana para aktivis bisa mengambil dan menyimpan video mereka selama shutdown, membagikannya secara offline dan melakukannya dengan lebih aman?

Dalam Seri Ini

Melalui kerja sama dengan para aktivis yang telah mengalami pemadaman internet, kami mempelajari beberapa tips dan pendekatan yang berguna untuk mengambil dan menyimpan dokumentasi video selama internet shutdown yang akan dibagikan melalui seri ini. Kami menulis tips ini untuk gawait Android, tetapi tips tersebut juga bisa diterapkan untuk iPhone. Beberapa strategi membutuhkan perencanaan terlebih dulu (dan seringkali, akses internet). Jadi sebaiknya baca, coba, dan terapkan dulu sebelum berada dalam situasi di mana sulit mendapatkan akses internet padahal harus melakukan pendokumentasian. Simpan salinan dari setiap tutorial sehingga bisa dirujuk dan dibagikan selama shutdown. Terakhir, mulailah mempraktikkan teknik dan metode berikut dalam kegiatan sehari-hari, sehingga menjadi kebiasaan sebelum berada dalam krisis.

• Persiapan
  • Menyiapkan ponsel untuk dokumentasi offline
• Pendokumentasian
  • Haruskah menggunakan aplikasi dokumentasi ini?
• Pemeliharaan
  • Menjaga media yang dapat diverifikasi selama internet shutdown
  • Mencadangkan media ponsel tanpa internet atau komputer
• Share dan Komunikasi
  • Berbagi file dan komunikasi selama internet shutdown

Catatan akhir: Meskipun tips tersebut dapat membantu pendokumetasian selama pemadaman internet, kami menekankan bahwa solusi akhir adalah harus memulihkan akses internet dan berhasil membela hak masyarakat untuk merekam, serta kebebasan berekspresi, informasi dan berkumpul. Untungnya, ada gerakan global yang dipimpin oleh organisasi seperti NetBlocks, AccessNow dan lainnya yang secara aktif memantau dan berbagi informasi terkait shutdown. Para advokat secara global juga terlibat dalam litigasi strategis terhadap shutdown. Kami berdiri dalam solidaritas dengan kerja-kerja mereka untuk menegakkan hak asasi manusia.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

WITNESS Asia is the Asia-Pacific branch of WITNESS, an international organisation that supports people using video in their fight for human rights. Access more guides on the WITNESS blog.

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With the ongoing targeted hatred and discrimination towards queer Nepali YouTuber Nikisha, and people of sexual and gender diversity, we want to stand stronger and louder with queer folks in solidarity. Body and Data condemns online harassment against women and gender and sexual diverse individuals.

To stand in solidarity with Nikisha, please sign the statement below. Since the call for signatures began on September 19, 2020, over 400 individuals and organisations have signed and showed support as of writing.

Find out more about the campaign by following the hashtag #SupportForNikisha on social media.

19th September 2020

Statement for Solidarity and Signature Campaign

#SupportForNikisha has been trending in Nepali twitter as a response to a video by a YouTuber where he is seen reacting to Nikisha’s personal social media accounts including Tiktok videos taken and used out of context, neglecting Nikisha’s narrative to the stories. This spewed a conversation online about the persistence of abundant hatred towards gender and sexual diverse people.  

One can find many videos of Nikisha online, mostly shared by YouTubers asking Nikisha personal questions around Nikisha’s life and sexuality, often in a demeaning way. Nikisha’s presence over Tiktok and other social media platforms is filled with such targeted hate speech and harassment towards Nikisha and other gender and sexually diverse people. The blatantly queerophobic comments re kolated to Nikisha’s online expression, only further showcases that when people of sexual and gender diversity try to take space on the internet, they are faced with discrimination and violence. 

Mind you, that Nikisha is still a minor and having been subjected to this level of online hatred and violence might be detrimental to their mental health. The video in question is dismissive and invalidates Nikisha’s sexuality and gender expression by constantly using their dead name, and the wrong pronoun. This not only shows a lack of professionalism, but is also a form of rampant transphobia.

Disguising these attacks as ‘reaction videos,’ policing the self expression of people from sexual and gender diverse communities, further normalizes homophobia/transphobia and creates as well as perpetuates all forms of negative stereotypes. Entertainers with strong followings should be mindful of the content they are putting on the Internet and how they can influence the general public to aid  marginalizing minority groups. Furthermore these contents are never ‘harmless’ and have deleterious consequences on the lives of those who are  targeted and also  for those who do not fit into the gender norms predominant in our society. 

Individuals who try to step outside the performance of binary gender norms are attacked, harassed and ridiculed in our society. In online spaces when faced with such violence, many leave the space altogether or self-censor themselves. The internet, like our offline spaces, is controlled and the power thereof is concentrated in the hands of cis-het men from higher castes who are predominantly from upper class. This has been a reason why women and gender diverse individuals are mostly attacked on their bodies and sexuality.  This not only curtails their freedom of expression and sexual expression , but also prohibits their participation in civic spaces by infringing on their right to privacy.

Body and Data condemns online harassment against women and gender and sexual diverse individuals and calls the perpetrators and bystanders to hold themselves and their actions accountable.

To stand in solidarity with #SupportForNikisha, please sign this statement with your name/pseudonym and your organization/group name (if applicable). Link to the original statement: Click Here

एक चर्चित युटुबरले निकिशा श्रेष्ठको टिकटक लगायत व्यक्तिगत सोसल मिडिया अकाउन्टमा भएको भिडियोहरुलाई लिएर निकिशाको व्यक्तिगत अनुभव र कथालाई भने उपेक्षा गरी असार्दर्भिक र भद्धा मजाक गरिएको भिडियो आफ्नो युट्युब च्यानलमा प्रकाशन गरेसँगै नेपाली ट्वीटरमा अहिले #SupportForNikisha अभियानको थालनी भएको छ । यसले अनलाईनमा लैंगिक तथा यौनिक विविधता भएका व्यक्तिहरुमाथि हुने घनिभूत अपमान र घृणासम्बन्धी बहस अघि बढाएको छ । 

केही अघि देखि नै निकिशाका विभिन्न प्रस्तुति भएका भिडियोहरु अनलाइनमा प्रशस्त भेट्न सकिन्छ । जसमा विभिन्न युट्युबरहरुले निकिशाको व्यक्तिगत जीवन त्यसमा पनि विशेष उनको यौनिकतामाथि अपमानजनक तरिकाले प्रश्नहरु सोधिएका भिडियोहरु धेरै भेटिन्छन् । निकिशा प्रस्तुत भएको त्यस्ता भिडियोहरुमा ऊ र समग्र लैंगिक तथा यौनिक विविधता भएका समुदायमाथि नै घृणायुक्त शब्द, गाली गलौजले भरिएका कमेन्टहरुको थुप्रो हुने गर्दछन् । लैंगिक तथा यौनिक विविधता भएका व्यक्तिहरुले अनलाइनमा आफ्नो उपस्थिती जनाउदै आफूलाई अभिव्यक्त गर्ने प्रयास गरिरहदा यस्ता विक्षिप्त र घृणापूर्ण कमेन्टहरु आउनुले उनीहरुमाथि हुने अनलाईन हिंसा र विभेद कति बलियो र कहालीलाग्दो छ भन्ने स्पष्ट पारेको छ । 

यहाँनिर बिर्सन नमिल्ने कुरा भनेको निकिशा एक नाबालिग हुन् र यो हदसम्मको अनलाइन हिंसा र घृणा भोगिरहदा उनको मानसिक स्वास्थ्यमा असर पर्ने पनि उत्तिकै खतरा छ । उल्लिखित भिडियोमा निकिशाको पुरानो (मृत) नाम र गलत संम्बोधनको बारम्बार प्रयोग गरी उनको यौनिकता र लैंगिक अभिव्यक्तिलाई सिधै नकारिएको देखिन्छ । जसले युट्युवरको पेशागत जिम्मेवारीको अभाव त देखाएको छ नै सँगसँगै यस्तो कार्य क्वेयर फोवियाकै एउटा नमुना भएको प्रष्ट बताउन सकिन्छ ।   

निश्चित समूदायमाथि आक्रामक त्यस्ता भिडियोहरुलाई ‘प्रतिकृत्यात्मक भिडियो’ को नाम दिदैमा त्यसले हुने हानी कम गर्दैन । यसले त अझ विविध लैंगिक तथा यौनिक समुदायबाट आएका व्यक्तिको स्वः अभिव्यक्तिलाई पुलिसिंग गर्ने र होमोफोबिया तथा ट्रान्सफोबियालाई सामान्यीकरण गर्दै सबै प्रकारका नकारात्मक स्टिरियोटाइपहरू स्थापित गर्दछ । अधिकतम् फलोअर्स भएका यस्ता मनोरंजनकर्मीहरु आफूले इन्टरनेटमा राखेको सामग्रीले अल्पसंख्यक समुहहरुलाई झनै सीमान्तीकरण गर्नको सट्टा उनीहरुलाई सहयोग पुग्ने गरी सामान्य जनसमुदायमा कस्तो सन्देश लैजाने भन्ने विषयमा बढी सजक हुनुपर्छ। साथै, यस्ता सामग्रीहरू पूर्णतः ’हानी रहित’ भने हुँदैनन् र आक्रमित समूदाय तथा समाजमा हावी रहेको लैंगिक मापदण्डहरूमा नपर्ने व्यक्तिको जीवनमा यसले थुप्रै हानिकारक परिणामहरू ल्याउछ भन्ने कुरा पनि मनन गरिनुपर्छ ।

समाजमा रहेको कि महिला कि पुरुष भन्ने द्वयसांखिक लैङ्गिक मापदण्ड भन्दा भिन्न लैंगिक प्रस्तुतीकरण गर्ने व्यक्तिहरुमाथि सामाजिक आक्रमण, उत्पीडन र उपहासपूर्ण व्यबहार गरिन्छ। अनलाइन र इन्टरनेटमा यस्ता खालका हिंसाहरु सामना गर्नु पर्दा, कत्तिले त्यो स्थानै छाड्छन वा आफैलाई प्रतिबन्धित गर्छन। इन्टरनेट या अनलाई स्पेस पनि हाम्रो वास्तविक दुनियाँ (अफलाईन स्पेस )जस्तै माथिल्लो बर्ग अनि उच्च जातका सिस हेट पुरुषहरू मै केन्द्रित र उनीहरुद्वारा नै नियन्त्रित छ । जसका कारण महिला र विविध लैंगीकता भएका व्यक्तिहरुको शरीर र यौनिकतामाथि अधिकतम् आक्रमण हुने गर्छ । यसले उनीहरुको यौनिक तथा समग्र अभिव्यक्ति स्वतन्त्रतालाई मात्र नभई गोपनियताको अधिकारलाई समेत हनन गरी सार्वजनिक स्थानहरुमा उनीहरुको सहभागितालाई निषेध गर्दछ ।

त्यसैले बडी एण्ड डाटा, समग्र महिला र लैंगिक तथा यौनिक विविधता भएका व्यक्तिहरू बिरूद्ध हुने अनलाइन हिंसा तथा उत्पीडनको निन्दा गर्दछ र दोषी तथा दोषीलाई मुकदर्शक भएर साथ दिने समुहलाई आफू र आफ्ना कार्यप्रति उत्तरदायी हुन आहृान् गर्दछ।  

अन्तमा हामी यस #SupportForNikisha अभियानका लागि यस ऐक्यबद्धता पत्रमा आफ्नो नाम या छद्यम् नाम सहितको हस्ताक्षर र ( उपयुक्त लागेमा) आफू आबद्ध संस्था या समुहको नाम सहित ऐक्यबद्दताका लागि आमन्त्रण गर्दछौं । 

मुख्य पत्रको लागि लिंक:  यता क्लिक गर्नुहोस्

About the Author

Body and Data is a movement based in Nepal that integrates feminism, technology and Internet rights, gender, and sexuality. They envision creating a free, open, and just Internet that respects the autonomy of the individual and upholds their dignity. A representative of Body and Data previously attended the Coconet camps. 

The post #SupportForNikisha: Join Nepali netizens to condemn online harassment against women, gender-diverse people appeared first on Coconet.