Protesters participate in an anti-military rally in downtown Yangon. Image by VOA Burmese via Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.

This statement by civil society organisations in Myanmar was originally published in Free Expression Myanmar, a Coconet community member, on February 11, 2021. It has been republished here with permission.

For more timely updates on #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar, check out and follow the Twitter accounts of Coconet members Free Expression Myanmar and Myanmar ICT for Development Organisation (MIDO).

We, the undersigned civil society organizations, reject the so-called “Cyber Security Bill” drafted by the current military regime, which has not been entrusted by the people with legislative power. 

On 9 February 2021, the Ministry of Transport and Communications issued a directive enclosing the so-called “Cyber Security Bill” – which violates the principles of digital rights, privacy and other human rights – and circulated these documents to mobile operators and telecommunications license holders for comments.

Firstly, as this “bill” is not issued by an institution that has been entrusted with legislative power by the public to act accordingly, we do not accept this as a legitimate bill.

Secondly, the “bill” includes clauses that violate human rights including the rights to freedom of expression, data protection and privacy, and other democratic principles and human rights in the online space. As the “bill” is drafted by the current military regime to oppress those who are against its rule, and to restrict the mobilization and momentum of online resistance, we strongly condemn this action by the current military regime in accordance with our democratic principles.

The issuance of the “bill” is evidence that the military has not only attempted a coup d’état, but is also exercising undue legislative power unlawfully to oppress the public.

If this unlawful action by the current military regime is not denounced strongly in time, military oppression over the country will be long-lived and we, the undersigned civil society organizations, strongly condemn this action by the current military regime and issue the following statements –

1. We do not accept and strongly condemn the military coup d’état and demand the current military regime to return the power to the public immediately without any exceptions.

2. We do not accept, acknowledge or comply with this “bill” and directive as well as any other future “bills” that may be drafted by the current military regime in an attempt to oppress the people.

3. We strongly demand the current military regime to halt any undemocratic practices.

Signed by:

1. Action Committee for Democratic Development (ACDD)
2. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Mandalay)
3. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Ayeyarwady)
4. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Bago)
5. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Magway)
6. Action Group for Farmers Affair (AGFA – Sagaing)
7. All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress-AASYC
8. Arr Marn Thit Social Development Organization
9. Arakan CSO Network
10. Ananda Data
11. Ahlin Tagar Rural Development Organization
12. Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organisation
13. Ayyar Pyo May Women Development Organization
14. AYY Famar Union
15. Ayeyawady West Development Organization- AWDO (Magway Region)
16. Bandugavlar Civil Call(BCC)
17. Bee House
18. Chin Agency
19. Child Prevention Network
20. Citizen Action for Transparency (ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာလူထုလှုပ်ရှားမှုအဖွဲ့)
21. Civic Engagement Development Network
22. Civic Engagement Network for M2
23. Community Association Development
24. Community Partners Myanmar (Nae Thit Foundation)
25. COMREG Community Response Group
26. Digital Rights Collective
27. Diversity and Public Truth
28. Doe Myae Civil Social Development Organization
29. Doe Myay Community Development Organization (Twantay)
30. Empower Youth Enlightenment (EYE)
31. Empowerment Society
32. Equality Myanmar
33. Famar Agricultural Network
34. Farmers Network (ဝမ်းတွင်း)
35. Farmers and Land Rights Action Group
36. Farmers Development and Environmental Watch Group
37. Free Expression Myanmar (FEM)
38. Free Education Service Organization
39. Freedom and labor Action Group
40. FREELAND Organization Lashio
41. Future Star (မတ္တရာ)
42. Future Star Youth Organization
43. Future Light Social Development Organization
44. Gender Equality Network
45. Genuine People’s Servants – GPS
46. GOAL Organization
47. Golden Future Social Development Organization
48. Golden Heart Organization
49. Green Justice Institute (GJI)
50. Helping Hands (Local Development Organization
51. Hkumzup Development Committee
52. Hope For Children  Development Organization
53. Htum Thit Sa Rural  Development Organization
54. Htoi Gender and Development Foundation
55. Human Rights Defenders & Promoters (HRDP)
56. Human Rights Educators Network
57. Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HRFOM)
58. International Bridges to Justice (Myanmar)
59. Justice For All (လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ခြင်းနှင့် တရားမျှတမှု့ )
60. Justice Movement for Community Inlay
61. Kaung Myat Hnalonethar Health Care Organization
62. Kan Chay Arr Man Fishery Development Organization
63. Kaung Rwai
64. Karenni State Farmer Union
65. Kayah Earthrights Action Network (KEAN)
66. Kachin State Women Network
67. Kachin Women Union
68. Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand (KWAT)
69. Kanaung Institute
70. Kanpetlet Land Development Organization
71. Karen Peace Support Network
72. Keng Tung Youth
73. KESAN Karen Environment and Social Action Network
74. Kings N Queens
75. Kyaukse Youth Network
76. Lamyan Farmers Network
77. LatButta Famar Union
78. Legal Knowledge Sharing Group
79. Let’s Help Each Other
80. LGBT rights Network
81. LAIN Technical Support Group
82. Light Social Development Organization
83. Lin lake Kyal Social Development Organization
84. Mandalay Affairs Team
85. Mandalay Community Center
86. Mandalay Regional Youth Association (MRYA)
87. Mandalay Regional Youth Network
88.  Mandalay Women Political Federation (MWPF – မန္တလေး)
89. Mann Thingaha (Gender GBV Team)
90. Maramagri Youth Network
91. MATA(Sagaing)
92. Matupi Women Association
93. Meiktila Youth Network
94. Minhla Youth Center
95. Muditar Organization
96. Myanmar Media Lawyers’ Network
97. Myan ICT for Development Organisation (MIDO)
98. Myanmar Cultural Research Society (MCRS)
99. Myanmar Deaf Society
100. Myanmar Fifth Estate
101. Myanmar Independent Living Initiative
102. Myanmar Muslim Youth Association (Kachin State)
103. Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State)
104. National Network for Education Reform
105. Natural Green Alliance (သဘာဝစိမ်း သဘာဝပါတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေး မိတ်ဖက် အင်အားစု)
106. Never End Tomorrow(NeT)
107. Network for Human Rights Documentation Burma (ND-Burma)
108. Ninggawn Institute (NI)
109. Northern Spectrum Youth Association
110. Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica
111. Open Development Foundation
112. Our Home
113. Our Lovely World
114. Olive Organization
115. P.D.C.E (Peace, Development & Civic Engagement)
116. Paung Ku
117. Pa-O Women’s Union
118. Pan Thi Kyo LGBT Organization
119. Paungsee Myittar Organization
120. Peace & Development Center (Meikhtila)
121. Peace Development Committee (မိတ္ထီလာ)
122. PEN Myanmar (ပဲန်မြန်မာ)
123. Phyu Sin Myittar Social Development Organization
124. Pluralistic Society
125. Pone Yate Sit Regional Development Organization
126. Progressive Voice
127. Pwint Phyu Development Organisation
128. Pyi Gyi Khin
129. Rule of law watch group
130. Rural Social Development Organization
131. SarPhyu Famar Network
132. Sarnar Kyi Phyu Social Development Organization
133. Sandhi Governance Institute
134. Saytana Shaesaung Youth Organization
135. Second Tap Root (ဒုတိယရေသောက်မြစ်)
136. Shan MATA
137. Shan State Ethnic Youth Federation
138. Shan State Peace Task Force (သျှမ်းပြည်နယ်ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးအလုပ်အဖွဲ့)
139. Shan Women Development Network
140. Shan Youth Yangon
141. Shwechinthae Social Service Group (Shwebo)
142. Shwe Nathar Famar Development Organization
143. Smile Myanmar
144. Socio- Economic & Gender Resource Institute
145. Social Care Volunteer Group (SCVG)
146. Southern Youth Development Organisation
147. SPACE
148. Spectrum Organization
149. Student Voice
150. Summer Shelter Library
151. Swam Su Ti Rural Development Organization
152. Ta’ang Women’s Organisation
153. Tai Youth Organization – TYO
154. TEN, Taunggyi Education Network
155. Thazi Youth Network
156. The Seagull: Human Rights, Peace & Development Pluralistic Society
157. The Khumi Institute (TKI)
158. TRI STAR
159. Triangle Women Support Group
160. TRY Organization
161. Uakthon Local Social Development Organization
162. Unity Arch Bridge Organization
163. Waingmaw CSO Network
164. White Marker Group
165. Win Peace
166. Women & Youth’s Development Organization (WYDO)
167. Worker Development Organization
168. Women Development Organization
169. Women organization Network ( WON )
170. Yatanar Youngyi Social Development Organization
171. Yai Ywal Yar Youth Development Organization
172. Yi Ywal Yar Community Development
173. Youth Champion Network
174. Youth/29 Creative Society
175. Young Ni Oo Women Social Development Organization
176. Young Ni Oo Social Development Organization
177. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် စဉ့်ကူး
178. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် မြစ်သား
179. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် မိထ္တီလာ
180. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် သပိတ်ကျင်း
181. ၈၈ငြိမ်းပွင့် သာစည်
182. ကျောက်ပန်းတောင်း လူငယ်ကွန်ယက်
183. ခြေလှမ်းသစ်လူမှုဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးအဖွဲ့
184. စိမ်းရောင်စို (တံတားဦး)
185. စိမ်းရောင်စို Activities
186. တမာရိပ်
187. တောင်သမန်ကွန်ယက်
188. ဒို့တိုးတက်ရာ အစည်းအရုံး
189. ဒို့တောင်သူလယ်သမားအဖွဲ့
190. ဒို့မြေကွန်ရက်
191. “ဒို့”တောင်သူလယ်သမားအဖွဲ့အစည်း(ဝမ်းတွင်း)
192. ပျော်ဘွယ် လူငယ်ကွန်ယက်
193. ပွင့်ဖြူလယ်ယာမြေကွန်ရက် (မကွေးတိုင်း)
194. မဇ္စျိမမေတ္တာ ရေလှူအသင်း (မိတ္ထီလာ)
195. မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီးအရပ်ဘက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ မဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့
196. မင်းလတောင်သူအစုအဖွဲ့။
197. မတ္တရာ လူငယ်ကွန်ယက်
198. မန္တလေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီး လူငယ်ရေးရာကော်မတီ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ
199. မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီးလူငယ်ကွန်ယက်
200. မြစ်ကွေ့ဧရာလူမှုကွန်ရက်(မကွေးမြို့)
201. မြေလတ်မျိုးဆက်အင်စတီကျု
202. မြင်းခြံ နိုင်ကျဉ်းအဖွဲ့
203. မြင့်မြတ်ဧရာဝတီ လူငယ်လူမှု့ကွန်ယက်
204. မြေလတ်မျိုးဆက်အင်စတီကျု
205. မေမြို့ တောင်သူကွန်ယက်
206. ယုံကြည်ရာ အသိပညာပြန့်ပွားရေးအသင့်
207. ရွှေခြင်္သေ့တောင်သူကွန်ရက်(ရွှေဘိုခရိုင်)
208. ရွှေခြံအားမာန်အဖွဲ့ မြင်းခြံ
209. ရွှေမင်းသားဖောင်ဒေးရှင်း
210. ရွှေမင်းသား မသန်စွမ်း ဖောင်ဒေးရှင်း ( မြန်မာ )
211. ရှစ်လေးလုံးသွေးသစ် (မိုးညှင်း)
212. လက်လှမ်းမှီရေးအဖွဲ့
213. လွတ်လပ်သောအရှိုချင်အမျိုးသားများအင်အားစု
214. ဝိုင်းမော်မြို့နယ်လုံးဆိုင်ရာ သျှမ်းလူငယ်များစည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့
215. ဝါးစိမ်းတောင်ကာကွယ်စောင့်ကြည့်ရေးကော်မတီ (WPWC)
216. သင့်မြတ်လိုသူများ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးပရဟိတအဖွဲ့
217. သုခမိန်အင်စတီကျု
218. သုခုမခရီးသည်အဖွဲ့
219. အမျိုးသမီးနိုင်ငံရေး အင်အားစု
220. အိမ်ယာမဲ့ပြည်သူများ အစည်းအရုံး
221. အောင်သာစည်အဖွဲ့
222. Gender and Development Institute
223. Good Shepherd Myanmar Foundation (GSMF)
224. Kachin Women Peace Network
225. Muditar Foundation
226. Myanmar Positive Women Network
227. Mandalar Yaung Sin
228. Myanmar Independent Living Initiative- MILI
229. National Network of Rural Women- May Doe Kabar
230. Phan Tee Eain (Creative Home)
231. POINT
232. Progetto Continenti
233. Ratana Metta Organization
234. Sex Worker in Myanmar Network
235. Spectrum (SDKN)
236. Socio-Economic & Gender Resource Institute Myanmar
237. Student Christian Movement Myanmar
238. Women’s Federation for Peace
239. Generation Wave

The post Myanmar Civil Society Statement on the draft Cyber Security Law appeared first on Coconet.

Days after this article’s original publication, the 2021 Electronic Transactions Law Amendment was enacted. The new amendment “includes several of the problematic criminal provisions” proposed in the Cyber Security Law.

Photo by Htin Linn Aye, taken from Wikimedia Commons and used under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license

This analysis outlines six serious risks posed by the Myanmar military government’s draft “Cyber Security Law”. It is based upon international standards relating to the right to freedom of expression. It builds upon a statement issued on February 11, 2021, by 250 civil society organisations in Myanmar, and other international statements.

The draft Cyber Security Law was circulated to stakeholders for feedback by February 15. The draft law has been under development for several years, and the circulated version is similar to the version from mid-2020 under the previous government.

1. The military will have absolute control over Myanmar’s internet

The draft law establishes a hierarchy of bodies overseen by and formed of representatives chosen by the military under the military’s governing State Administration Council (Arts. 5.a, 7, and 9). These oversight bodies are given absolute control over making internet and communications-related rules (Art. 6.a), implementing those rules (Art. 6.b), and investigating rule-breakers (Art. 12). Furthermore, the draft law also enables the Ministry of Defence to issue rules (Art. 88).

2. Regulates people, communications, and companies internationally

The draft law is unusual because it has a wide, extraterritorial reach, giving the military government an international jurisdiction as well as a normal domestic one. It creates international offences (Art. 2.a), applies to Myanmar citizens outside of Myanmar (Art. 1.a) and international organisations (Art. 6.h), and covers any form of international communications (Art. 1.c). This significantly extends the oppressive effect of Myanmar’s already restrictive domestic legal framework.

3. Increase in criminalisation and long prison terms

The draft law includes a variety of vague and overlapping crimes with three-year prison terms and fines, many of which do not have legitimate democratic aims. Three-year prison terms for misinformation or “fake” websites that cause “public panic, loss of trust or social division” are likely to be used to punish criticism (Arts. 64 and 65). Sharing “sexually explicit speech” – such as that currently being used by many Generation Z protesters – is also punished with a three-year prison term (Art. 68). Using false names or pseudonyms on Facebook will result in a three-year prison sentence (Art. 65). Several provisions include three-year prison terms for actions commonly done by whistleblowers (Arts. 57, 59, and 60). In addition to these disproportionate three-year prison terms, those convicted may also be charged under the Counter-Terrorism Law (Arts. 70 and 71).

4. Internet intermediaries criminally liable for the content

The draft law places both administrative and criminal liability on internet intermediaries such as Facebook, Google, and Telenor, while easing the military’s potential to ban them altogether. It includes a vague list of content that all “online service providers”, defined as “any person or business providing online services used in Myanmar”, must remove when ordered (Art. 29). The vague list includes for example, “verbal statements against any existing law” and is clearly intended to punish criticism. All “online service providers” must prepare in advance to receive orders (Art. 48), which may come from any person or organisation authorised by the military government (Art. 47).

If an intermediary does not comply with an order, the military government can issue a warning, fine, or temporary or permanent ban (Art. 72). Representatives of the intermediary will also face a criminal punishment of up to three years of imprisonment plus a fine (Art. 61).

5. Eases network control and internet shutdown

The draft law enables the military government to take direct control over network infrastructure and eases their ability to shut down the internet. It includes provisions for both temporary and permanent bans on any online service such as Facebook (Arts. 51.a and 51.c), and provisions for allowing the military government temporary control of any network devices (Art. 51.b). Bans must be in accordance with a vague “public interest”, presumably as defined by the military (Art. 51). The only so-called “safeguard” is that the military’s governing State Administration Council must approve the military-controlled ministry’s decision (Art. 51).

6. Private data put under military control

The draft law gives the military unfettered access to private data. It requires all “online service providers” such as Facebook, Google, and Telenor, to store vast quantities of personal private data including Citizenship Card numbers for at least three years (Art. 30). This data must be stored on servers designated by the military-controlled government (Art. 28.a), and be accessible for “national security” checks (Art. 59). There are no privacy safeguards (Art. 15) and data must be provided when requested (Art. 31). Any computer owned by anybody can be inspected on vague grounds (Art. 45).

Recommendations

The only institution in Myanmar with the constitutional mandate to adopt laws is the Union Parliament. Therefore, FEM rejects the draft Cyber Crime Law in its entirety. Nevertheless, FEM calls on all national and international stakeholders to remind the military government of their obligations under international law and Myanmar’s Constitution and to significantly revise any such “law” to address the six serious risks highlighted above.

The post #WhatsHappeningInMyamnmar: Six risks from Myanmar’s draft Cyber Security Law appeared first on Coconet.

A screenshot from the Digital Tea House campaign by MIDO

In support of the people of Myanmar protesting against the human and digital rights violations by the military, civil society organisations working in Myanmar or on Myanmar issues have published on Gitlab a list of digital security resources in Burmese. Localising digital safety resources are more important than ever, as Myanmar is on the brink of passing a controversial Cyber Security Bill that will further restrict internet access and freedom of expression online.

Among the contributors to this living Gitlab repository are the following Coconet community members: Myanmar ICT Development Organisation (MIDO), Free Expression Myanmar, and WITNESS Asia.

As of posting, you can access the following resources in the Burmese language.

1. Digital Tea House, a campaign by MIDO to promote digital safety awareness in Myanmar
2. A Myanmar Protesters Toolkit by Free Expression Myanmar
3. Mini guides by WITNESS on using video as evidence of human and digital rights abuses
4. A risk mitigation and management guide promoted by MIDO that details communication strategies for frontline journalists and others in Myanmar in case of internet disruption

Aside from these guides, you can also access another list of guides and readings from other organisations that have been localised in Burmese. Protestos.org has also translated some of its guides on protesting to Burmese.

If you would like to contribute a resource to this space, please contact us at [email protected]. The Gitlab will be updated as more resources are curated and verified.

The post Digital security and safety resources in Burmese now available in one database appeared first on Coconet.

The post Statement: Condemning the arrests of the students for protesting against the civil war in Rakhine state appeared first on Coconet.

Maung Saungkha and Kyaw Lynn are members of the Coconet community. Prior to his July 27 sentencing, Kyaw Lynn had published on Coconet.social articles on how the Myanmar internet shutdown is contributing to the COVID-19 pandemic and the government’s attempts to censor information on the Arakan (Rakhine) conflicts. Both members were arrested for participating in protests against the internet shutdown in Rakhine and Chin states, currently the longest shutdown in the world.

The statement was originally posted on the Human Rights Watch website and is being shared under the Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 US license. 

The Myanmar authorities should immediately drop the charge against the free-speech activist and poet Maung Saungkha, seven international human rights organizations said today. Police in Yangon charged him on July 7, 2020 with organizing a protest demanding an end to internet restrictions in conflict-affected Rakhine and Chin States. A court verdict is expected on September 4.

The authorities accused Maung Saungkha of hanging a banner reading, “Is the internet being shut down to hide war crimes and killing people?” from an overpass in downtown Yangon on June 21. He faces up to three months in jail and a fine for unauthorized protests under section 19 of the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law. June 21 was the one-year anniversary of mobile internet shutdowns in parts of Rakhine and Chin States.

“The charges against Maung Saungkha are just the latest example of the Myanmar government’s intolerance of critical speech and peaceful protest,” said Shamini Darshni Kaliemuthu, executive director at FORUM-ASIA. “Instead of prosecuting those peacefully protesting the year-long internet shutdown in Rakhine and Chin States, the authorities should uphold free expression rights by ending the shutdown.”

The international human rights groups are Access Now, Amnesty International, Article 19, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), Civil Rights Defenders, Fortify Rights, and Human Rights Watch.

The current National League for Democracy-led government, which took office in April 2016, has increasingly restricted the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful protest.

On July 27, a court sentenced two student leaders, Myat Hein Tun and Kyaw Lin, to one month each in Yangon’s Insein Prison for failing to give advance notice of a protest on February 23 in Kamaryut township in Yangon. During the protest, the students demanded that the government immediately lift internet restrictions in Rakhine and Chin States and called for accountability of those responsible for the Myanmar military’s alleged shelling of a primary school in Buthidaung township in Rakhine State that had injured 21 students.

On March 25, the court had sentenced seven other students who participated in the protest to one month in prison each with hard labor. All nine students were sentenced under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law.

The Peaceful Procession and Peaceful Assembly Law imposes criminal penalties for failing to provide advance notice for an assembly or to comply with broadly worded restrictions on speech and actions at assemblies. The restrictions are contrary to international human rights law, which prohibits criminal penalties for organizing or participating in a peaceful assembly. Imposing prison sentences is particularly harsh in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, when overcrowded and unsanitary prison conditions could facilitate its transmission.

The ongoing mobile internet shutdown in seven townships in Rakhine State and one township in Chin State also violates international human rights law, which requires any internet-based restrictions on communities to be necessary and proportionate. The government first imposed restrictions in nine townships in June 2019, only permitting voice calls and text messages, also known as SMS. The restrictions were temporarily lifted in some areas on September 1, 2019, but the government re-imposed the restrictions on February 3. They were removed in Maungdaw township on May 2, leaving eight townships still under restrictions.

The shutdown enters its second year amid heightened fighting between the Arakan Army, an ethnic Rakhine armed group, and the Myanmar military. Although the Ministry of Transport and Communications announced on June 23 that internet restrictions were provisionally extended only through August 1, 3G and 4G services remain blocked, with only 2G data networks available. The 2G speed is drastically slower and does not allow services such as videocalls, emails, or access to webpages with photos or videos. Restoring full internet access has taken on even more urgency ever since a fresh outbreak of local Covid-19 transmission cases in the State since mid-August.

On August 1, the Norwegian mobile telecommunications provider, Telenor, issued a media release stating that the Ministry of Transport and Communications had directed all mobile operators to extend internet restrictions on 3G and 4G mobile data services in the eight townships until October 31. Telenor expressed deep concern regarding the lack of “meaningful internet services, and for the impact on civilians.”

The Myanmar authorities have also ordered websites of independent and ethnic news media blocked, along with many other sites. The internet restrictions were imposed under section 77 of the Telecommunications Law, which grants the Myanmar authorities broad and arbitrary powers to suspend telecommunications networks. The government had cited a “security requirement and public interest” in its order to telecom companies to reimpose the restrictions, and later cited an escalation in fighting to continue them. The government also offered other rationales including concerns about hate speech, nationalist sentiment, disinformation, the Arakan Army using mobile internet to detonate IEDs and landmines, and “military secrets” online.

The Myanmar authorities should drop the charges against Maung Saungkha and quash the convictions against the nine student activists, the groups said. The government should repeal or amend all repressive laws, including the Telecommunications Law and the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law, which violate the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

“Myanmar’s government should restore full internet to the eight townships in Rakhine and Chin States,” said Matthew Bugher, head of Asia Programme, at Article 19. “The lack of meaningful communications or information-sharing capabilities poses further threats to people trapped by fighting amid the Covid-19 pandemic.”

This joint statement is endorsed by:

1. Access Now
2. Amnesty International
3. Article 19
4. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
5. Civil Rights Defenders
6. Fortify Rights
7. Human Rights Watch

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The post #StopInternetShutdownMM: Civil society marks 1 year of world’s longest internet shutdown appeared first on Coconet.

On May 3, 2020, the Myanmar government restored internet access in Maungdaw township, one of Myanmar’s nine townships in Arakan (formally known as Rakhine State) and Chin State without internet access for almost a year. The reason, they reported, was due to more stability in the area. But in reality, the grounds for reinstalling the internet are different from the reported reason. In fact, the government and military are using the internet shutdown to monopolize information, thereby robbing people of the truth on Arakan conflicts.

For the government of Myanmar, there are two burning political issues in Arakan: the question of armed revolution by the Arakan Army (AA), which the government has declared a terrorist group, and the case of ethnic Rohingya Muslims, who the UN International Court of Justice said should be protected from genocide and military violence. The two issues are related to each other – the self-determination of the Arakan region must consider the group rights of Rohingya Muslims, while the group rights of Rohingya Muslims must also be compatible with the autonomy of the Arakan community.

Countering AA through information and media

The military strategy to fight the AA and other rebel groups in the country can be summarised into cutting them off in four key areas: recruitment, food, budget, and information. The first three parts of this strategy have resulted in tens of thousands of innocent civilians displaced and moved to internal refugee camps. A number of villages have also been burned down in order to separate rebels and local supporters. From December 2019 to mid-April 2020, the nongovernment organization Burma Monitor reported over 163,000 displacements, 366 deaths, 406 injuries, and 45 arrests in Arakan and Chin State alone.

The fourth part, information, means to censor news and media about the Arakan conflicts. To do this, the government has sued and continues to sue local and international media under different laws such as counter-terrorism and unlawful association. Among the media outfits sued were national organisations Voice of Myanmar and Khit-Thit Media, as well as local media like Narinjara and Development Media Group (DMG). On top of this, websites by the AA and local media remain blocked in the country, meaning audiences cannot access information on them through locally operated telecommunication channels.

Due to the lawsuits, domestic media no longer interview the AA to get their side of the story, which in turn has led to one-sided or biased news, and even government and military propaganda. Here are four prominent examples of this, all within April 2020.

The April 29 shooting of a World Food Programme truck in Paletwa Town, Chin State was reported differently by national media (left) and state media. Whatever the truth is, it is alarming that the Arakan Army is automatically blamed without prior investigation, and the people in the conflict-stricken area not consulted.

On the morning of April 13, 2020, artillery shelling from the military’s Battalion No. 550 hit the Yangon-Sittwe Highway near the village of Kyauk-Sike, Ponnagyun township. Eight innocent civilians were killed and seven more were injured. This story was covered by a number of regional and international media like Reuters, Aljazeera, Radio Free Asia (RFA), and The Irrawaddy, which highlighted the event while also interviewing family members of the deceased. There was also evidence showing that the artillery and weapon marks were from Myanmar military products. However, the state media, especially military-owned ones like Myawaddy TV, reported there was no such event that day and that all news and information on it were fake and fabricated.

The second most prominent example is the April 20 killing of the World Health Organization (WHO) driver in Min-Bra Township, one of the conflict areas with no internet access, while carrying COVID-19 samples to be tested in Yangon. Both the government and the AA denied being behind the attack. Whatever the truth is, international media remained neutral in their coverage of the attack. But state media coverage and messaging to the local community concluded it was an AA attack, citing only statements from the government and military. The one-sided nature of the story has reportedly made the local people in Arakan angry and disappointed. Weeks later, the Myanmar government formed a committee to investigate the attack. The investigation is still ongoing, but based on previous statements, it is clear the commission will say it is an AA attack. In fact, presidential spokesperson U Zaw Htay already said even before the end of the investigation: “It (WHO car) was attacked by AA and we formed a committee to investigate it in order to fulfil the international demand”.

The third striking incident of the government’s monopolization of the truth is the April 21 killing of Arakan youth Kyaw Min Chey in May Lwan village, Min-Bra township. Government media like Global New Light of Myanmar and Myawaddy reported that an AA member (not a civilian), while on his motorbike, was killed after being caught with a Chinese-made grenade and a knife in a toolbox. But reports from RFA told the truth: After coming back from fishing, Kyaw Min Chay was killed by military soldiers at the entrance of his village, his mother a witness. After his death, the soldiers gave his family 150,000 MMK (or USD 104) as compensation, saying, “We are so sorry, and it is just usual thing happened in the time of war.” The family accepted the money because they were afraid of the soldiers.

The final and newest occurrence happened on April 29, when World Food Programme trucks were attacked while transporting food to Paletwa Town in Chin State. As usual, the government accused the AA, while the latter denied the claims. Paletwa is a mountainous and conflict-stricken area with no internet and media accessibility. Thus, only news by government media can reach it. As there remains a huge question of who to believe in this situation, it is all the more essential that non-government and international media be allowed to reach the area.

The arrest of the Nay Myo Lin (from Voice of Myanmar) shows that the Myanmar government has failed to take into account calls from various media freedom groups to protect journalists’ safety andfreedom of the press. IFJ urges the authorities to drop the case against Nay Myo Lin as the VOM was conducting a legitimate interview in response to a recently introduced ruling.

International Federation of Journalists

Monopolizing the news

These four examples have shown us how the government and military manipulate and monopolize news and information on conflicts in Arakan. Continuing to do so, however, can potentially escalate this conflict in the future. After all, the real motive of restoring the internet is less about the armed conflict or stability, and more about addressing international pressure, such as allowing the Rohingya Muslims’ voluntary repatriation. These efforts have since been suspended due to COVID-19 and the increasing number of cases in neighbouring Bangladesh. On top of that, the armed conflict in Arakan shows no sign of ceasing or reducing despite the AA’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire till the end of May 2020 due to the pandemic. These recent decisions have led to criticism of Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, thought by most democratic Burmese and non-Burmese ethnic people to be a moderator or mediator between the two sides of the armed conflict. It is also clear that these events have led to more identity-based politics, like Burmese vs non-Burmese people.

Let me highlight three sentences from the book 1984 by English novelist George Orwell: “War is Peace”, “Freedom is Slavery”, and “Ignorance is Strength”. The Myanmar government and military, like the book’s Ministry of Truth, are trying to rob the truth in Arakan conflicts, thus making people “more fearful” and “less knowing”. As the local people in Arakan become more fearful, they become mute. As the people in Myanmar become less knowing, they become blind and deaf.

Covering up these atrocities in Arakan makes “Wrong into Right” and “Right into Wrong”.

About the Author

Kyaw Lynn is a postgraduate student majoring in Political Science at the University of Yangon in Myanmar. He is also the chairperson of his university’s Political Science Association and one of the founders of Amnesty Arakan Team.

The post The Myanmar government is hiding the truth of Arakan conflicts appeared first on Coconet.

The internet is a primary source of information on the global COVID-19 pandemic. But Arakan (formally known as Rakhine State) in western Myanmar is now experiencing the longest internet shutdown in the world. Arakan is the second poorest area in Myanmar, with very weak health infrastructure in place. The internet blockage has also caused a lack of information and knowledge concerning COVID-19.

The first internet shutdown started in June 21, 2019, in four townships in northern Arakan. Another five townships (one in neighboring Chin State) followed in February 3, 2020. This coming April 21, it will be approximately 330 days since the first four areas have been without internet, while it will be nearly 100 days for the latter townships.

The government has given different reasons for the shutdown, such as the stopping of the hate speech, disinformation, and instability due to conflict in the area. None of these are justifiable.

The situation in Rakhine

Although the world is now fighting against COVID-19, over one million people in northern Arakan are still being neglected by the government action plan. As of April 19, Myanmar now has 107 positive cases and five deaths attributed to the coronavirus. The Myanmar government has not announced any case from Arakan. But this number is in danger of ballooning. Arakan is very close to Bangladesh, where there are a reported 2,456 positive cases and 91 deaths as of the same date. But if not addressed, Arakan will remain very prone to local transmissions in the border area.

The internet blockage has caused a lack of information and knowledge concerning COVID-19.

But different from most other parts of the world, the armed conflict is still ongoing in the region between the government’s Myanmar Army and the Arakan Army, despite the latter’s announced unilateral ceasefire until the end of April upon the recommendation of a global ceasefire by the UN Secretary-General. Instead, according to most analysts, the Myanmar Army is trying to take military advantage in Arakan by imposing more offensive military operations and leading to more innocent civilian deaths. Since the beginning of January to April 15 of this year, the Arakan Information Center reports that 377 civilians have died, injured, and disappeared. Most of them are women and children.

The conflict has resulted in about 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) in the region are also living in camps without any well-built shelter and well-managed food distribution. The lack of social distancing in the IDP camps, the lack of water availability, and the lack of information on COVID-19 make it impossible to prevent a coronavirus outbreak in the area.

Unfortunately, what makes the people to be more fearful is the military attack on the civilian target rather than COVID-19. It seems the Myanmar government and military are more enthusiastic to fight against the Arakan Army than COVID-19 in the region. But under these three situations – internet shutdown, IDP camps, and ongoing armed conflict – it is unimaginable how the situation could be worse in the future if COVID-19 were to hit Arakan.

Stop war and internet shutdown

During the global pandemic period, we need to stop the war and internet shutdown to fight COVID-19 in Arakan.

I am one of those people speaking out, even if I am currently now hiding from police search. On February 23, 2020, in Yangon, I led the Students’ Unions’ protest and demonstration against the internet shutdown and human rights violations in the conflict-affected areas of Arakan. I could be prisoned for one month with hard labor if I face the trial.

But it is just my case. The more important thing to focus on is to fight against the COVID-19. Over one million people in Arakan are vulnerable to the disease if we do not stop the war and internet shutdown.

Thus, let us say: Stop the war and internet shutdown to fight against the COVID-19 in Arakan. Your participation is our power. Your concentration is our courage. Your word is our want.

About the Author

Kyaw Lynn is currently a postgraduate student taking his master’s degree in political science at the University of Yangon, Myanmar. He is the chairperson of Political Science Association (University of Yangon) as well as the principal officer at Arakan Students Union (Universities-Rangoon). 

The post To fight COVID-19 in Myanmar, stop the war and internet shutdown in Arakan appeared first on Coconet.

Members of the Coconet community took part in the fourth Myanmar Digital Rights Forum (MDRF), which focused on the importance of digital rights in the face of disinformation, internet shutdowns, and emerging technologies.

Held on Feb. 28 and 29, 2020, at the Rose Garden Hotel in Yangon, the MDRF was organised by Phandeeyar, Myanmar ICT for Democracy Organisation (a partner during Coconet II), Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB), and Free Expression Myanmar. This year’s conference hosted over 350 attendees and speakers from government, businesses, and civil society, making it the largest digital rights forum in Southeast Asia.

We cannot afford to assume that digital rights will evolve at the same rate that the internet has.

- Jes Kaliebe Petersen, CEO of Phandeeyar

Two important events in Myanmar framed many of the discussions over the two-day forum: the upcoming elections in late 2020 and the internet shutdown in Rakhine and Chin states, which is going on its eighth month and has led to charges against nine students who organised protests against it.

Sessions that directly tackled these issues attracted the most attendees. Facebook representatives shared what it was doing to curb disinformation in the region.

Digital rights activist and Coconet I participant Daw Ei Myat Noe Khin, in her keynote speech, reiterated the calls to end the government shutdown.

On the first day of MDRF, the Coconet community also joined a worldwide social media campaign calling for the lifting of the internet shutdown.

Other important issues surrounding digital rights that were discussed during the event were:

1. Myanmar’s digital culture
2. Threats to freedom of expression online
3. Claiming ownership over your own data
4. National security vs right to information
5. Surveillance and the smart city
6. Creating a digitally accessible Myanmar
7. Artificial intelligence (AI)
8. Deepfakes
9. Women’s rights online
10. Data protection and cybersecurity
11. Digital content restrictions in Myanmar
12. Bridging the legal gap in digital rights

Members of the Coconet community who attended either or both Coconet camps also served as speakers and panellists at the conference, sharing personal experiences on topics related to digital rights. Wu Min Hsuan shared examples from Taiwan on the digital risks during elections. Gaya Khandhadai of the Association for Progressive Communications shared how she was targeted online based on her gender and religion. Witness.org, also a Coconet partner, talked about deepfakes and how this affects Southeast Asia.

EngageMedia’s Darika Bamrungchok and Red Tani were also among the forum’s speakers and panellists. On Day One, Red facilitated an open session titled, “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Rights in Southeast Asia”. The session began with a short video summarising the research of Dr. Jun-E Tan on AI and its uses, implications, and consequences in the region. It ended with attendees breaking out into smaller groups to identify how AI can both empower but detract from digital rights and other advocacies. There was also a consensus among participants that whether AI is good in the present and for the future, we need to first understand what exactly AI is in the first place.

Day Two had Darika as a panellist in the session titled, “Staying Safe: What does Myanmar need to do to put data protection and cybersecurity at the core of the digital revolution?”. Here she talked about Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Act and how its implementation can relate to and affect the Myanmar context. She was joined by other panellists from Microsoft, Privacy International, and MCRB, as well as the Ambassador to the Kingdom of Netherlands in Myanmar.

Regulation is not always the solution. When it comes to disinformation, criminalising speech won’t address the issue. We need a rights-respecting way forward.

- Daw Ei Myat Noe Khin, digital rights activist and Coconet I participant

Find out more about what transpired at MDRF by following the hashtags #digitalrightsMM and #MDRF2020.

About the Author

Sara Pacia is the Communications and Engagement Coordinator of EngageMedia. A journalist by training and multimedia storyteller at heart, she is passionate about utilising and appropriating today’s digital technologies for the empowerment of the public and the improvement of media and data literacy.

The post In Myanmar, Digital Rights Are Integral to Policy and Advocacy appeared first on Coconet.